Abstract. This paper studies how to build a 2n-bit block cipher which is hard to distinguish from a truly random permutation against attacks with q ≈ 2 n/2 queries, i.e., birthday attacks. Unlike previous approaches using pseudorandom functions, we present a simple and efficient proposal using a tweakable block cipher as an internal module. Our proposal is provably secure against birthday attacks, if underlying tweakable block cipher is also secure against birthday attacks. We also study how to build such tweakable block ciphers from ordinary block ciphers, which may be of independent interest. keywords: Block Cipher Mode, Birthday Bound, Tweakable Block Cipher.
Introduction
A double-block-length cipher (DBLC), i.e. a 2n-bit block cipher made from n-bit block components, has been one of the main research topics in the symmetric cryptography. In particular, a seminal work of Luby and Rackoff [17] proved that a 4-round Feistel permutation is computationally hard to distinguish from a truly random permutation if each round function is an n-bit pseudorandom function [11] . The proof of [17] is valid for chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCAs) using q ≪ 2 n/2 queries, and is called a proof of O(2 n/2 )-security. As 2 n/2 is related to the birthday paradox for n-bit variables, it is also called the security up to the birthday bound (for n). Then, building a DBLC having beyond-birthday-bound security, i.e., O(2 ω+n/2 )-security for some ω > 0, is an interesting research topic from theoretical and practical aspects. In particular, such a DBLC can improve the security of any block cipher mode that has O(2 n/2 )-security with an n-bit block cipher 1 . However, achieving O(2 ω+n/2 )-security is generally difficult, even for a small ω. We have very few known DBLC proposals having this property. All of them were based on Feistel permutations using pseudorandom functions [22] [18] [20] . Although these studies indicated the great potential of Feistel permutation, we wondered if using Feistel was the only solution.
In this paper, we demonstrate how this problem can be solved using a tweakable block cipher, defined by Liskov et al. [16] . In particular, we present how to build a DBLC based on a tweakable block cipher E with n-bit block and m-bit tweak for any 1 ≤ m ≤ n, and prove O(2 (n+m)/2 )-security against CCAs. One significant fact is that it is optimally efficient, as it requires only two E calls (independently of m) and some universal hash functions. Thus, assuming very fast universal hash functions (e.g., [25] ), our DBLC will have almost the same throughput as that of a tweakable block cipher. This means that, the task of building a secure 2n-bit block cipher can be efficiently reduced to that of building a secure n-bit block tweakable block cipher. We think this is an interesting application of tweakable block cipher, that has not been mentioned before. As a by-product, we provide some variants such as a pseudorandom function with 2n-bit input and n-bit output. All variants are optimally efficient in the sense defined above.
We have to emphasize that the birthday bound here is with respect to n, and not to n + m. The security of our scheme is still up to the birthday bound of input length of the cryptographic primitive (as with Yasuda [28] ). Although this makes the problem much easier in general, our result is still non-trivial and highly optimized as a solution to beyond-birthday-bound security for n.
As our DBLC requires a tweakable block cipher with beyond-birthday-bound security, we also discuss how to realize it. Specifically, we focus on constructions using n-bit block ciphers. Although known constructions [16] [24] are only O(2 n/2 )-secure, we provide a simple solution using tweak-dependent key changes with a concrete security proof. Unfortunately, this scheme is only the first step: it can be very slow and has some severe theoretical limitations, thus is far from being perfect. Building a better scheme remains an interesting future direction of research.
Preliminaries

Basic Notations
A random variable will be written in capital letters and its sampled value will be written in the corresponding small letters. Let Σ n denote {0, 1} n . The bit length of a binary sequence x is denoted by |x|, and x [i,j] denotes a subsequence of x from i-th to j-th bit, for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ |x|. A uniform random function (URF) with n-bit input and ℓ-bit output, denoted by R n,ℓ , is a random variable uniformly distributed over {f :
Similarly, a random variable uniformly distributed over all n-bit permutations is an n-bit block uniform random permutation (URP) and is denoted by P n . If F K : X → Y is a keyed function, then F K is a random variable (not necessarily uniformly) distributed over {f : X → Y}. If F K is a keyed permutation, F −1 K will denote its inversion. We will omit K and write F : X → Y, when K is clear from the context.
A tweakable block cipher [16] is a keyed permutation with auxiliary input called tweak. Formally, a ciphertext of a tweakable blockcipher, E : M×T → M, is C = E(M, T ), where M ∈ M is a plaintext and T ∈ T is the tweak. The encryption, E, must be a keyed permutation over M for every T ∈ T , and the decryption is defined as
block and m-bit tweak, we say it is an (n, m)-bit tweakable cipher. An (n, m)-bit tweakable URP is the set of 2 m independent URPs (i.e., an n-bit URP is used for each m-bit tweak) and is denoted by P n,m . We write P n if m is clear from the context.
Security Notion
Consider the game in which we want to distinguish two keyed functions, G and G ′ , using a black-box access to them. We define classes of attacks: chosenplaintext attack (CPA), and chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA), and their tweaked versions, i.e., a tweak and a plaintext (or ciphertext) can be arbitrarily chosen. Here, (tweaked) CCA can be defined when G and G ′ are (tweakable) permutations. Let atk ∈ {cpa, cca, cpa, cca}, where cpa ( cca) denotes tweaked CPA (CCA). The maximum advantage of adversary using atk in distinguishing G and
where
The parameter θ denotes the attack resource, such as the number of queries, q, and time complexity [11] , τ . If θ does not contain τ , the adversary has no computational restriction. The maximum is taken for all atk-adversaries having θ.
where the last two equations are defined if G is an n-bit permutation, Moreover, if G is an (n, m)-bit tweakable cipher, we define
(θ), and Adv
If Adv prf G (θ) is negligibly small for all practical θ (the definition of "practical θ" depends on users.), G is a pseudorandom function (PRF) [11] . If G is invertible, it is also called a pseudorandom permutation (PRP). In addition, if Adv sprp G (θ) is negligibly small, G is a strong pseudorandom permutation (SPRP). If G is a tweakable cipher, tweakable SPRP and PRP are similarly defined using Adv sprp G (θ) and Adv prp G (θ). Generally, we say G is secure if Adv sprp G (θ) is negligibly small. CCA-CPA conversion. In our security proof, it is convenient to use a conversion from a cca-advantage into a cpa-advantage. For this purpose, we introduce a subclass of cpa called cpa ′ , which is as follows. First, for any keyed permu-
. This expression also holds true for tweakable permutations, i.e., for any tweakable permutation G with message space M and tweak space T , ⟨ G⟩ is an equivalent keyed function : M × T × Σ → M. The LSB of a query to ⟨G⟩ is called a operation indicator. Consider F : M × Σ → M and a cpa-adversary D interacting with F . Let 
In general, cpa ′ is weaker than cpa when at least one of two target functions is not invertible. Note that, following the invertibility condition does not exclude all collisions that can not be happened for permutations. For example, if a cpa ′ -adversary is interacting with F = ⟨G⟩ for some keyed permutation G,
which is guaranteed from the invertibility condition). However M i = Y j can happen when (e.g.) F is a URF, as Y j is uniform and independent of X i for all i < j.
Maurer's Methodology
Our security proof will be based on a methodology developed by Maurer [19] . Here, we briefly describe it. See Maurer [19] for a more detailed description. Consider a binary random variable A i as a (non-deterministic) function of i input/output pairs (and internal variables) of a keyed function. We denote the event A i = 1 by a i , and denote A i = 0 by a i . We assume a i is monotone; i.e., 
Let MESs A and B be defined for two keyed functions, F : X → Y and G : X → Y, respectively. Let X i ∈ X and Y i ∈ Y be the i-th input and output. Let P F be the probability space defined by F . For example, P
where 
Definition 1. We write F
holds for all i ≥ 1.
Definition 2.
For MES A defined for F , ν atk (F, a q ) denotes 3 the maximal probability of a q for any atk-adversary usingueries (and infinite computational power) that interacts with F .
The equivalences defined by Definition 1 are crucial to information-theoretic security proofs. For example, the following theorem holds true.
We will use some of Maurer's results including Theorem 1 to make simple and intuitive proofs . For completeness, these results are cited in Appendix A.
Previous Constructions of DBLC
There are many O(2 n/2 )-secure DBLC proposals. Luby and Rackoff proved that the 4-round random Feistel cipher (denoted by ψ 4 ) is O(2 n/2 )-secure. Here, "random" means that each round function is an independent n-bit block PRFs. Later, Naor and Reingold [22] proved that the first and last round functions of ψ 4 need not necessarily be pseudorandom, but only required to be ϵ-almost XOR uniform (ϵ-AXU) for sufficiently small ϵ. Here, if H is a keyed function being ϵ-AXU, [22] , which is so-called NR mode.
Basically it is an mn-bit block cipher for arbitrarily large m, using n-bit block cipher, E. When m = 2, NR mode encrypts a plaintext M ∈ Σ 2n as:
where ECB[E] is the 2n-bit permutation from ECB mode of E. G 1 and G 2 are keyed permutations called pairwise independent permutations [22] . That is,
, where probability is defined by the distribution of G i 's key for i = 1, 2.
Compared to the vast amount of O(2 n/2 )-secure proposals, we have very few schemes achieving better security. A scheme of Aiello and Venkatesan [1] has some beyond-birthday-bound security but not invertible. A proposal of [22] was based on unbalanced Feistel round, where each round function has inputs longer than n-bit. The O(2 n/2 )-security of ψ 6 was proved by Patarin [18] and another proof of ψ r for r → ∞ was given by Maurer and Pietrzak [20] , though we omit the details here. 2 As ai denotes Ai = 1, this equality means P
The original definition does not contain atk; this is for readability.
Building a DBLC with Beyond-birthday-bound Security
Extending Naor-Reingold Approach
Our goal is to build a O(2 ω+n/2 )-secure DBLC, i.e., an 2n-bit keyed permutation which is hard to be distinguished from P 2n against any practical CCA using q ≪ 2 ω+n/2 queries for some ω > 0 (a large ω indicates a strong security). Our initial question is if we can adopt a Mix-Encrypt-Mix structure 4 similar to Eq. (3). In the following, we provide a novel solution using tweakable block ciphers. The scheme has Mix-Encrypt-Mix structure similar to NR mode, thus we call our scheme Extended Naor-Reingold (ENR) 5 . It has a parameter m ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and we will prove O(2 (n+m)/2 )-security.
For convenience, for any random variable X, we abbreviate X [1,m] to X (i.e., X is the first m-bit of X). If |X| = m, we have X = X. Let E be an (n, m)-bit tweakable cipher, and let E L and E R denote two independently-keyed instances of E. ENR consists of E L , E R , and a 2n-bit keyed permutation,
, the encryption and decryption of ENR are defined as Fig. 1 . Here, G rev denotes the mirrored image of G, i.e., G rev (x) = rev(G(rev(x))) with rev(x 1 , . . . , x 2n ) = (x 2n , . . . , x 1 ). We assume G rev and G use the same key. Basically, we can prove the security of ENR for a more general setting where the second mixing layer is not restricted to G rev . We here focus on the use of G rev because it allows us to reuse the key and implementation of G.
Security Proof of ENR
To prove the security of ENR[G, E], we first introduce a condition for G. [1,n+m] ] ≤ ϵ, and
and
A 2n-bit pairwise independent permutation is (2
Even a more efficient construction is possible by using Feistel permutation (see Corollaries 1 and 2). The security proof of general ENR is as follows.
. , n} and E is an (n, m)-bit tweakable cipher, we have
.
We also provide two instantiations of ENR with Feistel-based implementations of G. 
Corollary 1. Let m = n and ψ[H] be a balanced 2n-bit (left-to-right, see the left of Fig. 2) Feistel using a round function
Proof. When m = n, every 2n-bit keyed permutation is (0, γ, ρ)-AU for some γ = ρ. The probability of
Combining this fact and Theorem 2 proves the corollary.
Corollary 2.
Let m < n, and K 1 , K 2 , and K 3 be independent and uniform over GF(2 n ) (represented as n-bit values). We define
, 
where the last inequality follows from that H 1 is 2 −n -AXU and 
Proof of Theorem 2
Setup. Let us abbreviate ENR[G, P n,m ] to ENR * , where G is (ϵ, γ, ρ)-AU. We only present the information-theoretic part, that is, the indistinguishability of ENR * from P 2n against any computationally unbounded cca-adversary. The computational part is easy from the standard technique (see e.g., [2] ). For convenience, we introduce some notations. For any F : M × Σ → M with a set M,
using two independent URFs, R L , R R :
Let P L and P R denote two independent instances of P n,m . Using them, we also define DP :
in the same way as DR but R R and R L are substituted with ⟨ P R ⟩ and ⟨ P L ⟩, respectively. Here, note that GDP is equivalent to ⟨ENR * ⟩. The proof outline is as follows. We analyze cpa ′ -advantage between GDP and ⟨P 2n ⟩, which corresponds to what we want from Eq. (2). Then, using the triangle inequality, we move as GDP ⇒ GDR ⇒ R 2n+1,2n ⇒ ⟨P 2n ⟩, that is, we evaluate the maximum cpa ′ -advantages for the game with GDP and GDR (Game 1), and the game with GDR and R 2n+1,2n (Game 2), and the game with R 2n+1,2n and ⟨P 2n ⟩ (Game 3). Formally, we have
Analysis of Game 3. By extending the well-known PRP-PRF switching lemma (e.g., Lemma 1 of [4]), we easily get
Analysis of Game 2. We first observe that GR 2n+1,2n ≡ R 2n+1,2n , and thus Adv
since pre-and post-processing added by G are permutations. Fig. 3 ). These notations will also be used for adversaries accessing to GF . We define an MES E = e 0 e 1 . . . , where e q denotes the event that
is undefined), and the corresponding output is denoted by (U
holds for all possible i ̸ = j, i, j ∈ {1, . . . , q}, e.g., Eq. (10) for i ̸ = j with W i = W j = 0. Then, we obtain the following equivalence. Its proof is in Appendix B.
From Eq. (12) and Lemma 2, we have
Using Eqs. (9) and (13) and Theorem 1, we obtain
We leave the analysis of the last term of Eq. (14) for now. Analysis of Game 1. We consider the indistinguishability between ⟨ P n,m ⟩ and R n+m+1,n . We first focus on the input/output collision for the same tweak value. More precisely, let (
The corresponding MES, A = a 0 a 1 . . . , is called the generalized collision-freeness (GCF). Then, we have
The proof of Eq. (15) is written in Appendix C. As mentioned, if we substitute R L and R R with ⟨ P L ⟩ and ⟨ P R ⟩, we will obtain DP. Thus, from Eq. (15), we get
where AL = al 0 al 1 . . . denotes the GCF for ⟨ P L ⟩ or R L , and AR = ar 0 ar 1 . . . denotes the GCF for ⟨ P R ⟩ or R R , and CL and CR are some MESs (implied by Eq. (15)). The second equivalence follows from Lemma 2. Thus, using Theorem 1 we obtain Adv
For DR and R 2n+1,2n , the occurrence of al q ∧ar q can be completely determined by the q inputs and outputs. From this fact and Lemma 5, we can adjoin AL∧AR to the both sides of Eq. (12) and obtain
Moreover, it is easy to see that E ∧ AL ∧ AR ≡ AL ∧ AR holds for DR and R 2n+1,2n . Combining this observation, Eq. (18), and Lemmas 2 and 3, we have
, and Adv Collision probability analysis. Combining Eqs. (7), (8), (14), and (19), and Lemma 4, we have
We need to bound ν cpa ′ terms of Eq. (20) . First, the maximum probabilities of al q and ar q (under GR 2n+1,2n ) are the same because of the symmetry from Eq. (4) and that G rev is a mirrored image of G. Thus we only need to evaluate the maximum probabilities of al q and e q .
As shown by Eqs. (10) and (11), e q consists of collision events such as
for all possible i ̸ = j, i, j ∈ {1, . . . , q}. Moreover, al q consists of collision events such as
Note 
Pr[e i ] + 2
From Eq. (9), the adversary's choice must be independent of (the key of) G and G rev . With this fact, each collision probability of Eq. (21) . Without loss of generality, we assume i < j. The probability of
Since G is invertible, the inputs to R 2n+1,2n [0] are always distinct. This implies that U E j is independent of previous variables (including U E i , T E i and T E j ) and uniform, even conditioned by the event T E i = T E j . Thus we get
is uniform and independent of (SE i , T E i ), thus collision probability is exactly 2 −(n+m) . When j < i, XE i ̸ = Y D j must hold as we consider cpa ′ -adversary (i.e., XE i = Y D j for j < i means an intentional invertibility check). Hence
Thus we have Pr[
as it is the collision probability over (n + m) bits.
In summary, we obtain all maximum collision probabilities:
Combining Eqs. (24) and (21) proves the theorem.
PRP and PRF Versions of ENR
Although our primary target is a DBLC secure against CCA, a slight simplification of our proposal yields a CPA-secure variant of ENR. It saves some operations from the original ENR at the cost of a weaker attack class.
Definition 4. The simplified ENR (sENR) is defined as ENR with G rev being omitted (or, substituted with the identity function).
Corollary 3. Let G be (ϵ, γ, ρ)-AU. Then, the cpa-security of sENR[G, E] is:
The proof is similar to that of Theorem 2, thus is omitted here. The reason why G rev can be omitted is that, we do not have to consider some bad events (e.g., the collision of ( U D, V D)) that have to be avoided by G rev when decryption query is possible. Moreover, by truncating the rightmost n-bit output, we obtain a PRF :
. . , n (the proof is trivial from Corollary 3). We emphasize that ENR, and the simplified ENR, and its truncated-output version are optimally efficient, for they need exactly c calls of E when the output is cn bits, for c = 1, 2.
A Simple Construction of Tweakable Block Cipher with Beyond-birthday-bound Security
Our proposal requires a tweakable block cipher with beyond-birthday-bound security. Then, one may naturally ask how to realize it. A straightforward approach is building from scratch, e.g., Mercy [9] and HPC [8] . Recent studies [10] [21] demonstrated that adding a tweak to some internal variables of a (generalized) Feistel cipher could yield a secure tweakable block cipher. This technique, called direct tweaking, may well be applied to a concrete tweakable cipher using (e.g.) S-box and linear diffusion. Another approach, which we focus on, is building from ordinary block ciphers. There are several schemes [16] [24] that turn an n-bit block cipher into an (n, n)-bit tweakable cipher. However, they only have O(2 n/2 )-security 8 . Building a tweakable block cipher with better security has been considered as rather difficult (Liskov et al. mentioned it as an open problem [16] ).
Our solution is simple and intuitive: changing keys depending on tweaks. This idea was possibly in mind of [16] . However, to our knowledge it has not been seriously investigated 9 . Although our scheme is simple, its security proof needs some cares. Throughout this section, we occasionally write E K instead of E, if we need to specify the key we use. 
Proof. Let R : Σ m → K be the URF. We have
The first term of R.H.S. for Eq. (25) is clearly at most Adv prf F (η, τ + O(q)), as we can evaluate F or R on at most η points. For the second term, the adversary can produce at most η instances of E, and their keys are independent and uniform (as keys are generated from URF). For each sampled key, the adversary can query at most q times 10 . Thus, the second term is at most ηAdv sprp E (q, τ + O(q)) from the triangle inequality.
At first glance, TDR seems to provide a desirable security, since it simulates the tweakable URP in an intuitive way. However, this is not always the case. For example, when K = Σ n and m = n, a simple attack using about 2 n/2 queries can easily distinguish TDR from P n,n : we first query a fixed plaintext with many distinct tweaks, and if a ciphertext collision is found for tweak t and t ′ , then query a new plaintext with tweaks t and t ′ and see if the new ciphertexts collide again 11 . Nevertheless, this scheme can have beyond-birthday-bound security if tweak length is not longer than the half of block length:
Here, TDR[E, E ] is secure if 2 −(n−2m) is sufficiently small and E is computationally secure, where "secure" means cca-advantage being much smaller than 2 −m . Unfortunately, Corollary 4 does not tell us how large q is admissible by itself, since the first term of the bound would not be negligible if q is large. Nonetheless, as the first term is at least ητ
(achieved by the exhaustive key search, see [3] ), we expect that TDR[E, E ] is computationally secure against attacks with q ≪ 2 n−m queries, if E is sufficiently secure.
Practically, the big problem of TDR is the frequent key scheduling of E, as it may be much slower than encryption. Still, the negative impact on speed could be alleviated when on-the-fly key scheduling is possible. Combining ENR and TDR. A combination of ENR and TDR provides a DBLC using an n-bit block cipher E. Let us consider combining the schemes from Corollaries 2 and 4. The resulting DBLC needs 4 calls of E and two key schedulings of E. By assuming Adv
n , the security bound of this DBLC is about 2q/2 n−m + 8q 2 /2 (n+m)/2 + 2q 2 /2 2n + 1/2 n−2m . Then the choice m ≈ n/3 achieves the security against q ≪ 2 2n/3 queries for fixed n, which is the best possible for this combination. For example, if we use AES (i.e., n = 128) and set m = 42, the combined scheme's security is about 83.5-bit, assuming AES's security. Compared to the previous DBLCs having 64-bit security, the gain is not that large, but non-negligible. Of course, the security and efficiency of the resulting ENR would be greatly improved by using a better AES-based tweakable block cipher.
Conclusion
We described the extended Naor-Reingold (ENR), which converts an n-bit block tweakable block cipher into a 2n-bit block cipher. ENR has the beyond-birthdaybound security (for n) if underlying tweakable block cipher does, and has almost the same throughput as that of the tweakable block cipher. Hence, we have shown that a good (i.e., fast and secure) tweakable cipher implies a good double-blocklength cipher. We also described a way to convert an n-bit block cipher into tweakable one and achieves beyond-birthday-bound security based on the computational indistinguishability of the underlying block cipher. Unfortunately, this scheme has both theoretical and practical drawbacks due to its frequent rekeying. Thus, finding an efficient scheme without rekeying would be an important open problem. Future directions. It would be interesting to extend ENR to mn-bit block cipher for m > 2 and make ENR tweakable, keeping beyond-birthday-bound security for n. Both problems can be basically solved by using ENR as a module of some known block cipher modes (e.g., CMC mode [12] ) as they have O(2 n )-security with 2n-bit pseudorandom permutation. However, more efficient constructions may well be possible.
A Lemmas from Maurer's Methodology
We describe some lemmas developed by Maurer [19] that we used in this paper. We assume that F and G are two random functions with the same input/output size; we define MESs A = a 0 a 1 
C Proof of Equation (15)
We abbreviate R n+m+1,n and P n,m to R and P, respectively. From the definition of GCF event a q , it is easy to derive ⟨ P⟩|A ≡ R|A. 
